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biity in the law of damages in this state; but that it missed an excellent opportunity to make a much greater one.
LAYTON

A. POWER

Cost Plus Contract. Walsh Services, Inc. v. Feek, 145 Wash. Dec. 269, 274 P.2d 117
(1954) involved a contract to remodel a house on what the court construed to be a
cost plus basis. When the job was finished, plaintiff building contractor presented a
bill to defendant that came to about double the price quoted in plaintiff's original
estimate. The defendant refused to pay the bill and plaintiff sought to foreclose a
mechanic's lien on defendant's property. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
decision that plaintiff could recover only what the job should have cost. This figure
was arrived at by the computations of a reputable architect. It was held that a cost
plus contractor must exercise the same skill and ability he would use on a contract for
a fixed sum, and that the contractor must show that money he claims to have expended
on the job was necessarily expended for labor and materials on the job. If the contractor cannot show these facts, he may recover only the reasonable cost, plus his
percentage.
Reasonableness of Expense Incurred. In Cudmore v. Tiomsland, 44 Wn.2d 308, 266
P2d 1058 (1954), plaintiff sued for defendant's breach of a warranty that certain
livestock was free from disease. The only issue before the Supreme Court was the
amount of damages. The court sustained defendant's contention that the amount of a
veterinarian's bill was not established by competent evidence, since there was no
testimony as to the reasonableness of the bill. The court relied on Carr v. Martin,
35 Wn.2d 753, 215 P2d 411 (1950), as authority for its holding. The Cart case and
those cited therein involved medical, hospital and nursing expenses incurred as a result
of personal injuries, however, and may be rather dubious authority for the holding in
the Cudmore case.

DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Divorce-Child Custody. In Habick v. Habich', the mother was
awarded the custody of the children, then six and four years of age, in
1948, in an interlocutory decree of divorce. For three years the children
had lived at the respective homes of the mother's mother, the father's
parents, and of the mother, followed by nearly two years at the home of
the father. This had been due to the father's failure to make support
money payments, the mother's past ill health, and the father's unwillingness to surrender the children during school terms. When the mother
remarried and desired to take the children back, the father instituted
this proceeding to modify the divorce decree by transferring the custody
of the children to him. The court found that the mother and her new
husband were "very suitable as guardians for these growing children" 2
and that there were adequate school, church, and recreational facilities,
'44 Wn2d 195, 266 P.2d 346 (1954).
2 rd. at 200, 266 P.2d at 349.
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and scouting organizations at their home. Notwithstanding these findings, the court held that the circumstances of where the children had
become happily established in the home of their father for a considerable period of time outweighed the desirability of having the children
live with their natural mother.
This decision would seem to be inconsistent with the rule, long followed by the courts in divorce cases where the custody of a child is at
issue, that the paramount concern of the courts is the welfare of the
child, and, if the child is of tender years, its welfare will ordinarily be
best served by awarding its custody to the mother unless it clearly appears that she is so far an unfit and improper person that her custody
of it would endanger its welfare.'
The reasoning behind the rule was set forth in an early Washington
case' on the problem in language which has been quoted with approval
many times as follows: "Mother love is a dominant trait in even the
weakest of women, and as a general thing surpasses the paternal affection for the common offspring, and, moreover a child needs a mother's
care even more than a father's."'
However, in support of this complete deprivation of the mother's
custody, the court cited a Washington case* where, because of the
settled condition of the children in school in Vancouver, Washington,
8 Allen v. Alien, 38 Wn2d 128, 228 P2d 151 (1951). The courts have felt compelled to disregard this rule, known as the "tender years doctrine", in exceptional cases
such as Broech v. Broech, 159 Wash. 409, 293 Pac. 464 (1930), where an older brother
of bad repute lived with the mother.
4 Freeland v. Freeland, 92 Wash. 482, 483, 159 Pac. 698, 699 (1916).
5 Thus, the fact that a mother's conduct is not what others might think the most
proper is not of itself sufficient to deprive her of the right to the custody of her child.
See the following cases in which the mother was awarded custody: Sorge v. Sorge,
112 Wash. 131, 135, 191 Pac. 817, 818 (1920) ("had been somewhat reckless in her
manner"); Prothero v. Prothero, 137 Wash. 349, 350, 242 Pac. 1, 1 (1926) ("was
guilty of certain indiscretions"); Mason v. Mason, 163 Wash. 539, 540, 1 P.2d 885,
885 (1931) ("on a few occasions ... may have-been somewhat indiscreet"); Ostrander
v. Ostrander, 176 Wash. 669, 670, 30 P2d 658, 658 (1934) ("was self willed, unstable
and indiscreet' and boarded her child out at several places from the time the parents
were separated in September, 1929 until October, 1930) ; Flint v. Flint, 15 Wn.2d 443,
"131 P.2d 426 (1942) (suffered from a mental illness, as did her two sisters, which was
of a recurring nature) ; -Hansen v. Monagahan, 21 Wn2d 695, 152 P.2d 712 (1944)
(boarded her children in Washington and lived in California) ; Rogers v. Rogers, 25
Wn2d 369, 380, 170 P.2d 859, 864 (1946) ("was guilty of indiscretionate [sic] acts
and misconduct") ; Norman v. Norman, 27 Wn2d 25, 29, 176 P.2d 349, 351 (1947)
("admits she is an adulteress") ; Sewell v. Sewell, 29 Wn2d 190, 195, 186 P.2d 372,
375 (1947) ("neglected her baby, especially during the first few months after his birth
when her motherly care was most needed'); Pearce v. Pearce, 37 Wn.2d 918, 924,
226 P.2d 895, 899 (1951) ("absented herself from her home on occasion to the possible
prejudice of the children") ; Bigelow v. Bigelow, 39 Wn.2d 824, 825, 239 P.2d 317, 317
(1951) ("was guilty of drinking and improper conduct") ; Guiles v. Guiles, 41 Wn.2d
377, 379, 249 P.2d 368, 369 (1952) (did not have "control of her emotions").
6 Hathaway v. Hathaway, 23 Wn.2d 237, 160 P.2d 632 (1945).
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where they had lived from 19421 until 1945, the court awarded divided
custody to the father during the school year and to the mother during
the vacation periods. But in that case there were additional circumstances against awarding the mother complete custody in that each
parent had been granted a divorce from the other because of mutual
misconduct and the trial court had "admonished both parties that
certain changes of conduct must take place so far as the children were
concerned." Further, it was found that the father and his married
sister, who kept house for him, were in a better position to take care of
the children than the mother who lived in the "modest family home! 9
in Long Beach, Washington and engaged in "various kinds of employ10
ment.
A Washington case, perhaps more in point, is Schorno v. Schorno"
where the mother was awarded a divorce together with the custody of
the children. After several months in a vain attempt to live and support
her two children upon the amount she was receiving from the father
she surrendered the children to him temporarily. Two years later the
father petitioned for and was awarded the custody of the children. In
reversing the trial court and awarding custody to the mother the court
said, "We are convinced that appellant then did the only thing that she
could do when she turned the children over to respondent. Her right
to the custody of her sons is nowise prejudiced by her act."1 2
It would seem that in the balance of what is best for the child's
welfare, if the mere establishment in the home of the father for less
than two years outweighs "the mother's gentle care and affection,"'' 3
then we have come to a point where the courts no longer assign much
weight to what the courts previously considered "the birthright of
every child."'"
Divorce-Almony. The criterion or standard that the Washington
courts have adopted respecting the allowance of alimony is based on
two factors: (1) The necessities of the wife; and (2) the financial
ability of the husband.15 The only way a decree granting alimony can
be modified is by the showing of a material change in The conditions
7Brief of Appellant, page 3.

8 Note 6 supra, at 240, 160 P.2d at 634.
9

Id. at 239, 160 P.2d at 234.

10 Ibid.

1126 Wn.2d 11, 172 P2d 474 (1946).
"1 Id. at 20, 172 P.2d at 479.

is Delle v. Delle, 112 Wash. 512, 515, 192 Pac. 966, 967 (1920).
14 Mason v. Mason, supra note 4 at 541, 1 P.2d. at 886.
15 Patrick v. Patrick, 43 Wn.2d 139, 260 P.2d 878 (1953).

1955]

WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1954

and circumstances of the parties since the decree was rendered which
is still existing at the. time of application for its modification."8 From
the decisions, it is apparent that the change in the conditions and circumstances contemplated has reference, as in the first instance, to the
necessities of the wife and the financial ability of the husband.'
Gordon v. Gordon,8 a 1954 Washington case, and Warning v. Warning,"9 a 1952 Washington case of very similar facts, were actions to
modify a decree granting alimony. In each case, when the wife was
awarded alimony, prices were low and she was able to work and when
she sought to increase the alimony, prices were -high, she was unable
to engage in heavy labor due to an arthritic condition of the back, and
the husband had a large increase in earning power.
Notwithstanding the similarity of facts, the courts arrived at different results. In the Warning case the court took judicial notice of the
shrinkage in the purchasing power of the dollar, held that there was a
material change in the conditions and circumstances of the parties, and
awarded an increase in alimony. But in the Gordon case the court refused to award an increase in alimony and stated that "the fact that
the wife's financial requirements have increased is not alone sufficient
to establish need for increased alimony payments. It must also be
shown that there is no other practicable way of meeting the financial
20
problems. 2
Thus, the Warning case inferentially adopts the rule that the wife is
not obliged to seek employment, if able to work, to relieve the husband
of the obligation of support when he has the ability to support. But the
Gordon case holds that, when possible, the wife must either obtain employment or make economies in her living expenses.
The decision of the Gordon case would seem to be a return to the
doctrine that if the wife is able to work and there is no good reason why
she should not do so, she ought not to be encouraged to remain in idleness. This doctrine originated in Lockhart v. Lockhart' where it appeared that at the time of the divorce the community property had been
divided, and that the husband had paid $9,100 in alimony in four years,
but that the wife, who had no children, had made no effort to obtain
work. The court said, in effect, that it was against the policy of the law
16 Bartow v. Bartow, 170 Wash. 409, 16 P2d 614 (1932).
'1.Bartow v. Bartow, 12 Wn.2d 408, 121 P.2d 962 (1942).
1844 Wn.2d 222, 266 P.2d 786 (1954).

19 40 Wn.2d 903, 247 P.2d 249 (1952).
20
Note 18 supra, at 227, 266 P.2d at 789.
21145 Wash. 210, 259 Pac. 385 (1927).
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to give a divorced wife a perpetual lien upon her divorced husband's
future earnings, except under the most unusual circumstances.
This doctrine, however, has not been in accord with the settled law
in this state. Viewing the Lockhart case in its legal aspect, it is to be
observed that no cases are cited in support of the decision.' The Washington courts have distinguished the Lockhart case or have refused to
follow the rule declared therein in several cases23 and have applied its
policy in but one case." But whether or not this is a return to the Lockhart doctrine, the fact remains that the court has apparently switched
its position with respect to the obligation of the wife to seek employment.
RicmHuu, D. BONESTEEL
Divorce-Right to Collateral Attack. In re Englund's Estate," was
a proceeding on petition of decedent's sister to remove decedent's
purported wife as administratrix of his estate. Petitioner alleged that
the purported wife's marriage was void because her divorce from her
previous husband was granted by an Idaho court at a time when neither
of the parties to the divorce was domiciled in Idaho. The trial court
found that the purported wife was not domiciled in the state of Idaho
at any time during the divorce proceedings. Judgment was entered
removing her as administratrix and this appeal followed. In determining, as a matter of first impression in this state, whether decedent's
sister, for herself and other collateral heirs, strangers to the divorce,
should be permitted to attack the Idaho divorce, the Supreme Court in
a 5-4 decision held that a stranger to a divorce decree had no standing
to attack it in an action to determine private property rights unless the
divorce decree affected some right or interest which the stranger had
acquired prior to or at the time of entry of the final decree of divorce.
To this opinion a vigorous dissent was entered by four members of
the court. They argued that RCW 26.08.20026 is an expression of strict
public policy declared by the legislature and that it was not within the
22
25

Bartow v. Bartow, supra note 17.
Underwood v. Underwood, 162 Wash. 204, 298 Pac. 318 (1931); Warning v.
Warning, 5 Wn2d 383, 105 P2d 715 (1940); Bartow v. Bartow, supra note 17;
Warning v. Warning, 21 Wn.2d 85, 150 P.2d 64 (1944) ; Duncan v. Duncan, 25 Wn.2d
843, 172 P.2d 210 (1946) (see the separate concurring opinion of Simpson, J., which
states that the Lockhart case should be overruled) ; Warning v. Warning, 40 Wn.2d
903, 247 P.2d 249 (1952).
24 Murray v. Murray, 26 Wn2d 370, 174 P.2d 296 (1946).
25 145 Wash. Dec. 660, 277 P.2d 717 (1954).
26 "A divorce obtained in another jurisdiction shall be of no force or effect in this
state if both parties to the marriage were domiciled in this state at the time the proceeding for divorce was commenced."
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purview of the court to whittle such public policy away by decision.
They also emphasized that it has always been recognized at the common
law that "... the invalidity of void marriages could be maintained in
any proceeding, either direct or collateral, before or after the death of
the parties."2' 7
The majority answered the public policy argument advanced by the
dissent by reasoning that ". .. the public is interested only in the
sanctity and retention of the marital status and not in property rights."
...Public policy is not concerned with and does not extend to a situation where an action is commenced for the purpose of determining
private property rights. In such an action a stranger to the decree has
no standing to attack it unless such decree affected some right or interest which he had acquired prior to its rendition."2 9 The argument of
the minority of the court pertaining to the common law right of collateral attack was also dismissed by the majority who apparently recognized that such a common law doctrine existed, yet held it inapplicable
where a stranger to the divorce proceeding, who has acquired no right
or interest prior to the rendition of such decree, seeks to collaterally
attack the divorce.
It was further indicated by the dissent that some of the authorities
relied upon by the majority to sustain their decision "1... are beside
the point with which we are here concerned ."' ' * Indicative of such
1 which held as did the majority in
authority is Crockett v. Crockett,"
27 145 Wash. Dec. 660, 668, 277 P2d 717, 722 (1954), citing In re Romano's Estate,
40 Wn2d 796, 805, 246 P.2d 501, 506 (1952).
28 145 Wash. Dec. 660, 665, 277 P2d 717, 720 (1954).
29 Id. at 666, 277 P.2d at 721. A further argument suggested by the court as militating against public policy requiring the non-recognition of these irregular foreign
divorces is that "It is questionable whether the legislature intended to extend its
declaration of public policy to situations which would result in-bigamous marriages
and illegitimate children, the.result of such mariages:' However would such children
necessarily be illegitimate in view of RCW'26.08060 which provides for the legitimacy
of those children conceived or born during the existence of a marriage of record which
is later declared void and entitles such children to'all the rights of legitimate children
notwithstanding the subsequent annulment of the marriage? -Does not this statute
substantially eliminate the threat of such children being declared illegitimate?
so Id.at 670, 277 P.2d at 723."
8126 Wn.2d 877, 181 P2d 180 -(1947). This case concrned an action by the administrator of his deceased mother's estate against his father. He alleged that-a final decree
of divorce obtained by his father from the deceased should be set aside because of fraud
and that he be decreed to be the owner of one-half of the property belonging to the
parties at the time of the divorce. The court held that the plaintiff being a stranger to
the divorce decree and having no interest in the subject matter of the divorce action or
the property therin involved, at the time the final decree of divorce was entered, was not
entitled to bring the action. The dissent in the Englund case, distinguished Crockett v.
Crockett upon the basis that, "There the divorce under attack was only voidable and the
language used was directed at the point that, the divorce decree-being only voidable, the
death of the party having the sole right to challenge it ended further inquiry." The
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the present case. However there was no question in that case involving
jurisdiction or of a void decree of divorce.
3 Union Bank
The cases of Dietrich v. Dietrich,"
& Trust Co. v. Gor3
"
don,' and In re Romanski's Estate were also cited by the majority. As
to their lack of persuasive authority in the principal case the dissent
stated. "It is universally recognized that a litigant, by his own conduct,
can estop himself from invoking a statute such as the one with which
we are here concerned. These three cases are estoppel cases and as
such are beside the point with which we are here concerned." 5
As further support for their decision the majority cited the rule as
stated in Freeman, Judgments: "It must not, however, be understood
that all strangers are entitled to impeach a judgment. It is only those
strangers who, if the judgment were given full credit and effect, would
be prejudiced in regard to some pre-existing right, who are permitted
to impeach the judgment. Being neither parties to the action nor entitled to manage the cause nor appeal from the judgment, they are by
law allowed to impeach it whenever it is attempted to be enforced
against them so as to affect rights or interests acquired prior to its
rendition.""8
In the footnote supporting the general rule announced, Freeman
cited thirty-four cases in which this general rule was applied. However
not one of these thirty-four cases concerned a divorce collaterally attacked as void for lack of jurisdiction. In the same note the author then
cited Estate of Pusey, "limiting the rule that a third party's pre-existing
rights had been adjudicated, and holding it inapplicable where a divorce
decree, coming collaterally in question in a proceeding to probate a will,
is attacked as void."37 Hence it would seem that this qualifying note to
majority of the court in the Englund case although interpreting the decision in Crockett
v. Crockett in a somewhat different light, nevertheless admitted that there was no
question in that case involving jurisdiction, or of a void decree of divorce.
s41
2
Cal2d 497,.261 P.2d 269 (1953).

116 Cal. App.2d 681, 254 P.2d 644 (1953).
34 354 Pa. 261, 47 A.2d 233 (1946).
35 145 Wash. Dec. 660, 670, 277 P2d 717, 723 (1954).
38 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 319 (5th ed. 1925). In re Tamke's Estate, 32 Wn.2d
927, 204 P.2d 526 (1949) cited by the majority, similarly was an estoppel case.
37 In re Pusey's Estate, 180 Cal. 368, 181 Pac. 648 (1919). The appellants attacked
the order of the lower court which admitted the will of testatrix to probate, upon the
ground that the will was revoked by the alleged marriage of the testatrix. The respondents contended that the testatrix never in fact became married in that her purported husband had never been validly divorced from his former wife and hence that
the will in question had never been revoked. The basis of the appeal is that the lower
court improperly overruled appellants objection that it is not proper for a stranger,
who had no interest in the outcome of a judgment at the time it was made, to collaterally attack it, even upon the gkound that it is void for want of jurisdiction. The
court in overruling the objection of the appellants and-allowing the respondent to
'3
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the general rule should eliminate Freeman, Judgments8 as an authority
for the proposition advanced by the majority in the principal case3 9
Notice should also be taken of the impossible position in which a
claimant, such as the respondent in the principal case, is placed by
virtue of the rule announced in the Englund case. Such a claimant being
a stranger to the divorce decree can have no standing to attack the decree in an action to determine private property rights in that, since a
living person can have no heirs, he can acquire no right or interest
prior to or af the time of entry of the final decree of divorce.
JOHN R.

To1mINsON

Divorce-Distribution of Property. Bernier v. Bernier, 44 Wn2d 477, 267 P.2d
1066 (1954). Holding 1: "We know of no divorce case... in which... the. issue
has been presented... and an award of property to the parties as tenants in common has been approved." But see Wells v. Wells, 130 Wash. 578, 228 Pac. 692
(1924), which held, "We do not feel warranted in disturbing the decree, in so far as it
awards to each an undivided one-half interest in the farm." See 29 Wash. L. Rev. 115
(1954). Holding 2: "While a property settlement agreement, fairly reached, should
have great weight with the court in determining the property rights of the parties to a
divorce action, it is not binding on the court." But c.f. Parsonsv. Tracy, 127 Wash. 218,
220 Pac. 813 (1923), which held, referring to a property settlement agreement, ".... yet
courts will not set aside a contract deliberately entered into unless it clearly appears
that there was such overreaching as amounted to a deliberate fraud."
Child Custody--Change in Conditions Based on Interference with Visitation Rights.
In Joslin v. Joslin,145 Wash. Dec. 333, 274 P2d 847 (1954), the divorce decree awarded
the father the custody of the children subject to the mother's right to visit said children.
Subsequently the father removed the children from Spokane, Washington to Phoenix,
Arizona and the mother filed to modify the divorce decree based on a change of circumcollaterally attack the purported husband's divorce, states that "a judgment absolutely
void . . . may be attacked anywhere, directly or collaterally, whenever it presents
itself, either by parties or strangers. It is simply a nullity, and can be neither a basis
nor evidence of any right whatever. . . . It is indeed stated in 23 Cyc. 1068, that
strangers to the record can attack a judgment only when rights accruing to them prior
to its rendition are affected. We have examined all the cases cited to support this
statement. In each case property rights had been the subject of adjudication, and the
rights of the party attacking the judgment had arisen with respect to the property in
question after the judgment had been rendered. The judgment was in no case alleged
to be void. Obviously no rule based on these cases had any application to the case at
bar."
38 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 319 (5th ed. 1935).
39 However it should be mentioned that the Florida court in deMarigny v. deMarigny, 43 So2d 442 (Fla., 1949), invoked 1 FREEmAN, JUDGMENTS § 319 (5th ed.
1925) to preclude collateral attack by a third party in a situation somewhat similar to
that of the Englund case. In the deMarigny case the plaintiff brought suit to annul a
marriage upon the ground that the defendant never was legally divorced from his first
wife in that the Florida court which granted the divorce did not have jurisdiction. It
was contended that the state was a third party and was not estopped to collaterally
attack the divorce. The court upon the basis of the rule in FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS, supra,
denied the collateral attack and dismissed the annulment upon the ground that the decree of divorce under attack had not adversely affected the rights of plaintiff which
existed at the time of entry of the decree.
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stances interfering with the rights of visitation granted in the original decree. The trial
court granted the father's motion for judgment on the pleadings and the mother appealed. The court, deciding for the first time whether an allegation of such facts is a
sufficient allegation of change of circumstances to require a hearing on a petition to
modify the divorce decree, held that ".... the welfare of innocent children, victims of
a broken marriage, is too important and too sacred to be disposed of by a judgment on
the pleadings, unless it clearly appears from the face of the record that the petitioner
(mother) has no right to a modification of the divorce. Here the application alleges
facts showing at least an interference with, and perhaps a deprivation of the right of
visitation granted in the original decree. Those alleged facts show a change of condition
entitling appellant (mother) to a hearing on her application for modification."
Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Saville v. Saville, 44 Wn2d 793, 271, P2d 432
(1954), concerned a wife's suit to annul a marriage upon grounds that she was induced
to enter it by the fraudulent misrepresentations of her husband. The Superior Court
of King County entered a decree of annulment upon the default of the husband, and the
prosecuting attorney pursuant to the authority vested in him by RCW 26.08.080, appealed to the Supreme Court. There was no question but that the wife was induced to
enter into the marriage through the fraud of the defendant. However, it was the
appellant's contention that whatever jurisdiction the court formerly had to annul voidable marriages was withdrawn by the divorce act of 1949, and that only void marriages
could now be annulled. The court refused to accept fully the argument of the appellant,
and expressed no opinion as to his broad thesis that it was the legislative intent that the
remedy of annulment no longer was to be available in cases where the marriage was
voidable. Rather, the court narrowed the decision to only those marriages described as
voidable by RCW 26.04.130 and for which the remedy of divorce is provided by RCW
26.08.020(1). As to these marriages the court held that annulment no longer is available and that divorce is now the exclusive remedy. However as to those marriages
which are voidable and are not included within RCW 26.08.020(1), such as marriages
prohibited by RCW 26.04.030, the remedy of annulment apparently will still be allowed.
For a comprehensive discussion of the ramifications of the Saville case and of the general problem of annulment of voidable marriages under the divorce act of 1949 see
Comment, Annulment Under the Washington Divorce Act of 1949, 30 WASH. L. Ray.
62 (1955).

EQUITY
Mandamus-Taxpayer's Capacity to Maintain Action Against State
Officers. In State ex rel. Lemon v. Langlie' four taxpayers (relators)
commenced an action in the Superior Court seeking a writ of mandate
to compel the governor of the State and the individual commissioners,
etc., of thirteen state administrative agencies or departments (respondents) to return the offices, books, records, and functions from
Seattle, where they were located, to Olympia, the State Capitol. It was
alleged that the relators had addressed a written demand to the Attorney General of the state requiring him to act in the premises, and that
1 145 Wash. Dec. 74, 273 P.2d 464 (1954).

See also ConstitutionalLaw at page 92.

